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Have you got yours yet?
Posted on October 1, 2005 by Editor
By Glee Cady <gleecady@gmail.com>
“We write to inform you that your financial information may have been compromised…”
It’s only a matter of time, really, until you find yourself a recipient of an information breach notice.
According to the reckoning kept by the excellent Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
(http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm) more than 50,000,000 (yes, 50 Million)
electronic records that contain sensitive information about people have gotten potentially into the
wrong hands. The count grows higher every month. The tally is only as accurate as the reports,
of course. By that I mean that in many systems it is impossible to accurately identify what
records have been accessed. The size estimates of the breaches stem most likely from
calculations of the total number of records in the affected data stores. To be responsible to their
customers, record-keepers usually report the worst-case scenarios if they can’t determine
exactly which records were exposed.
Thus, Houston, we record-keepers have several problems here.
Some of the data protection problems stem from our own naiveté, I think. It’s not that business
is intending to expose information. After all, most businesses do not want their customer or
employee information available to competitors or fraudsters, whether or not there is a law or
regulation forbidding it. Exposing information helps neither the business nor the customer. Nor
does releasing medical information or student information help the patient, the student, the
medical facility or the school. Few record-keepers want their records exposed.
Hacking.
Breaches termed “hacking” really mean intrusions into systems that were not adequately
protected: an insecure server, an unclosed or unlocked back-door.
Institutions of any size at all have lots of records. Not all the records are necessarily where the
custodians think they are. We don’t necessarily know who made copies; we don’t know who
viewed which records; and if we’re really unlucky, the copies we don’t know about aren’t
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protected adequately
In many systems, it is very easy indeed for an authorized user to export some records out of a
database: names and addresses, accounts with certain characteristics, or just a whole set of
records unintentionally. Usually systems have features to do this built in. (On a personal level, look
at the relative ease with which you could move your contact files from one email client to
another.) The smaller database copy may be used for a mailing list, research or system testing,
or providing an additional report that isn’t easy to tease out of the larger database. It’s easier to
keep those records rather than to erase the files when our task is complete. After all, we might
“need” the records again. Once several people have generated these private reports, we have
“private data stores” scattered around an institution. Even if the institution has good data security
practices, it’s pretty easy to set up a computer, put it on the local network, and if the person
setting it up doesn’t really understand security processes, the system will be insecure from the
get-go. Many new computers ship with “open” systems: default settings for administrator
passwords, settings that make it easier for the manufacturer’s technical staff to diagnose
problems from a remote location, for example.
Many systems supporting record-keeping;  financial, medical, and school transcript information
databases were designed and built in a time where disk space was very expensive and
processing transactions as fast as possible was critical. This meant that logging at the data
element, or even record level, was out of the question. It wouldn’t even have occurred to most
system designers to think of logging as something to trade-off against some other design
requirement. Simply put, the money wasn’t available to provide that level of diagnostic
ability. “Journaling” or keeping a record of change transactions (usually in order to reconstruct a
database in the even of a system failure) can be used sometimes in diagnostic traces. But that
wouldn’t help us with simple viewing of records. That print screen key is both a help and an
information leakage device.
Another system design trade-off that implementers have hesitated to make is encrypting the
information, especially at the individual record level. With encryption, one trades processing speed
for security. When each transaction has a cost and businesses have an obligation to their
shareholders to keep costs down (see any Wall Street analyst report discussing viability and
future prospects of a listed corporation), it’s hard for the security team to “sell” the concept until
there is an incident. In the not too distant past, software encryption techniques could double or
triple the processing time needed. This meant that only one-half to one-third of the number of
transactions would fit through the “pipe”. Even worse, users got long delays waiting for their data
result to appear. If users were on dial-up connections and located far from the main system, their
sessions could easily “time out” in the middle of an inquiry. Screaming users on the help line can
also affect programming design decisions.
Fortunately, encryption technology is improving (even as the bad guys are getting better) and
installations of encryption devices are becoming not only feasible but common.
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Intrusion detection systems have been in much the same place. These systems, as you would
expect from their name, report when an intrusion is detected. “Tuning” the systems, so that they
report actual problems rather than false alarms, requires very skilled and knowledgeable security
engineers. Putting additional barriers in front of a database slows down the access. Slowing
down access makes for unhappy customers, whether internal or external. And intrusion
detection systems are frequently targeted in “other guy’s fault” finger-pointing during problem
diagnosis sessions. The complexity of today’s system configurations makes fault diagnostics a
real challenge.
Stolen/mislaidBackup Tapes.
Encryption can help record-keepers here. For many systems, the backup tapes, even if not
encrypted, will be difficult (but not impossible, you understand) to read. The records would be in
proprietary formats. And then you’d need the right kind of tape drive. Of course, if you have
access to the right kind of data center and you have knowledge of the format, it’d be relatively
simple. Offsite backup tapes are most often stored in reputable, bonded locations, but for some
businesses, the computer center manager’s garage doubles as an offsite warehouse. Not
because of incompetence, of course, but habit.
Dishonest or disgruntled insider. 
This one scares us all. We can run background checks, We can monitor employees. We can try
to make sure our customers are who they say they are. But we can’t always catch this one
before something bad happens. And despite the growing concern about this problem, it still
remains one of the biggest challenge for security managers.
Stolen computer.
One of the earliest reported financial information breaches came from research copies: a
researcher was reviewing loan transaction records, investigating borrower behavior. The
database was on a laptop, locked in an office. The office was burglarized and the laptop was
missing. The financial records were vulnerable and no one (except the thief) knows if they were
accessed. There have now been many instances of stolen computers. Law enforcement
representatives believe that many of the stolen laptops are taken to gain the equipment rather
than the information. In general, information thieves will steal servers rather than laptops: more
bang for the buck. Owners of laptops with business or financial information are learning to be
much more wary. Computers are locked away, even if in offices. They are not left in automobiles
over night and not left unattended at all.
Notifications. 
With the rising count of people affected, legislators and regulators have been working to provide
additional regulatory safeguards. Much attention has been paid to the recent spate of legislation
requiring record-keepers to notify the person owning the data if sensitive information has been
lost, stolen, or possibly strayed. The laws are generally based on a California state law usually
termed SB 1386. (The full code as enacted can be found
here: http://www.privacyprotection.ca.gov/leg2002.htm.) This law helped by defining the
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characteristics of “sensitive” data: combinations of information that may result in identity theft or
other financial harm. Essentially, we are talking about the conjunction of enough information that
a thief could gain a new credit account using your information, or charge something to an
account you already have. Other states and the federal legislature have passed or are debating
similar laws. The current status of these state efforts can be found
here:http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm#breach or
here:http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/CIP/priv/breach.htm. EPIC tracks federal legislation
here: http://www.epic.org/privacy/bill_track.html.
Notification laws won’t make information thieves go away.  Nor will they magically protect your
information. Notification letters won’t make you feel better. They will give you information and
instructions. They’ll tell you what information may have been disclosed. They’ll tell you how to
watch your credit accounts and how to contact the credit reporting institutions. If you receive
one, at the very least, read it. Follow the instructions. Don’t ignore it. It’s the least you can do to
protect yourself and others you care about. It’s a start.
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